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(NOT) ADVISING CORPORATE OFFICERS ABOUT
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Lyman P.Q. Johnson*
Robert V. Ricca**

I was not aware that it was a breach of the duty of loyalty to
place one's own interests ahead of the interests of shareholders.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article explores the intersection of an important,
unresolved corporate law issue and an overlooked professional
responsibility issue persistently arising in the corporate milieu. The
corporate law question-currently unaddressed in Delaware law-is
whether the fiduciary duties of corporate officers, as agents, are the
same as, or different from, the fiduciary duties of corporate
directors. A related question is whether, in reviewing officer
conduct, courts will apply the business judgment rule in the same
broad (and protective) manner in which it is applied to assessing
director behavior.
The professional responsibility issue concerns whether, and how
well, lawyers are advising corporate officers about their fiduciary
duties. In recent years, much attention has been given to the
professional obligations of a corporate lawyer upon learning, ex post,
of corporate wrongdoing, including director and officer breaches of
fiduciary duty.2 Virtually no attention has been paid to whether, ex
* Robert 0. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University
School of Law.
** Attorney, Fenwick and West LLP. The positions reflected herein are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of Fenwick and
West or its partners. The authors thank the following persons for comments on
earlier versions of this Article: participants at the Wake Forest University
School of Law's symposium on The Duties of A Modern Corporate Executive,
Elizabeth Brown, Neil Hamilton, Thomas Holloran, William Simon, and Rob
Vischer. The Frances Lewis Law Center at Washington and Lee University
School of Law provided financial support.
1. Rita K. Farrell, Walt Disney Directors on Trial for a Payout, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at C10 (quoting the deposition testimony of Stephen
Bollenbach, Chief Financial Officer and Director of the Walt Disney Company).
2. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 784
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7245); Standards of Professional
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ante, lawyers are adequately helping to prevent such misconduct by
fully and properly advising corporate officers as to the scope and
thrust of their fiduciary duties.3 Fiduciary duties, as one element
for shaping officer conduct to promote healthy corporate governance,
are of little preventive value if not properly transmitted to officers,
given that officers are unlikely on their own to understand those
duties.4 As is the case with directors, lawyers are the obvious means
by which such communications to officers would be expected to
occur. How well are they fulfilling this vital role?
We seek, in exploring the convergence of these two topics, to
contribute as well to the growing interest in gaining firsthand
knowledge about how key corporate actors actually interact and
communicate with one another "inside" the corporation.5 Moreover,
in taking this more empirical and contextual approach, we wish to
redirect the governance spotlight away from the customary focus on
directors, however important directors are to corporate well-being.
We examine, therefore, not the director-lawyer relationship, but the
dynamics of the neglected officer-lawyer interaction. We believe this
relationship is, or can be, a chief component of effective corporate
governance.
We obtained information on this subject in two ways. First, we
sent a survey questionnaire to approximately one hundred corporate
lawyers serving primarily as outside legal counsel in major U.S.
Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in
Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.4-.7 (2003) (creating a duty to
report "up" an officer's, director's, or agent's violation of securities law or breach
of fiduciary duty) [hereinafter Standards of Professional Conduct].
3. In recent years, attention has been given to the role of the lawyer as
"gatekeeper." See, e.g., Coffee, infra note 76. Also, commentators have begun to
focus on ways in which lawyers can contribute to preventing corporate
misconduct. See Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers
in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1097, 1097 (2003); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Financial Information Failure and Lawyer Responsibility, 31 J.
CORP. L. 1097, 1103-04 (2006) (collecting and assessing commentary on lawyer
responsibility for preventing financial information failure). Our point is that a
lawyer's advice on officer fiduciary duties, specifically, can be a vital component
of a larger, preventive role for lawyers.
4. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., RICHARD LEBLANC & JAMES GILLIES, INSIDE THE BOARDROOM 3
(2005) (creating a methodology that makes it "possible to study the manner in
which boards function in real time"); Deborah A. DeMott, Inside the Corporate
Veil: The Characterand Consequences of Executives Duties, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP.
L. 251, 252-54 (2006); David O'Donnell & Phillip O'Regan, Exploring Critical
Dialogue in the Boardroom: Getting Inside the Empirical Black Box of Board
Dynamics (March 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Intellectual
Capital
Research Institute
of Ireland), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=900967.
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metropolitan areas. We received eighteen responses, seventeen of
which were from lawyers practicing corporate law.6 We hoped for a
higher response rate but believe we gained useful information from
this pilot study. Second, we examined the websites of fifteen major
law firms to learn what they say about themselves on the topic of
advising corporate officers as to fiduciary duties.
Overall, the
results from our survey and website research suggest that many
lawyers do not provide full-bodied fiduciary duty advice to officers in
their capacity as officers at all, much less advise them as to the
possibility that their duties might be stricter than those of directors
or caution that the business judgment rule may not apply to officer
conduct in the same way it applies to director conduct.
Part I briefly describes the current, unsettled state of the law
with respect to officer fiduciary duties and the availability of the
business judgment rule when officer conduct is judicially reviewed.
Part II describes the methodology and results of our empirical
research. Part III offers several reasons why corporate lawyers
should advise corporate officers as to their fiduciary duties and
describes a proposed procedure for assuring directors that legal
counsel is regularly providing such advice.
II.

THE UNSETTLED STATE OF THE LAW ON OFFICER FIDUCIARY
DUTIES

Corporate officers play a critical role in corporate governance.
They also have played a central role in numerous corporate
scandals,7 and for the most part they do not enjoy broad public
trust.'
Both fraud prevention and the encouragement of more
laudable corporate conduct, therefore, must focus on corporate
officers, not just directors. The imposition of fiduciary duties on
corporate decision makers-including officers-is widely thought to
be one way to achieve better corporate governance. 9 Yet, there is
remarkably little law on the basic substantive question of what the

6. One respondent answered the survey questions but noted that he or she
primarily practiced tax law. We disregarded this response for consistency. As
noted in Part III infra, we intend to separately survey in-house legal counsel,
most likely through questionnaires directed to the Association of Corporate
Counsel, an organization of in-house legal counsel. One of the respondents in
our initial survey is an in-house lawyer.
7. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon,.Recalling Why Corporate Officers
Are Fiduciaries,46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2005).
8. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1317
(2006) (citing results of a recent poll on lack of public confidence in corporate
managers).
9. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory,
56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 21-25 (2006).
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fiduciary duties of corporate officers really are"° and virtually no
theoretical attention to the issue of what those duties should be and
why.1
Delaware law contains abundant dicta on, but has never
squarely addressed, the issue of whether officers are subject to the
same fiduciary duties as directors.12 Nor has Delaware addressed
the related and pivotal question of whether officer conduct should be
judicially reviewed under the deferential business judgment rule
standard. 3 Factually, this issue was nicely presented in the
protracted Disney litigation because two of the defendants-i.e.,
General Counsel Sanford Litvack and CEO Michael Eisneralthough also directors, had each acted and were sued in their
capacities as officers. 4 As noted by Chancellor William Chandler in
his trial court opinion, 5 however, at trial the legal nature of the
fiduciary duty claims made by the plaintiffs against Litvack and
Eisner as officers was essentially the same as that of the claims
made against them (and other defendants) as directors.
On appeal, the plaintiffs abruptly changed course and argued
for a stricter review of officer conduct-i.e., that of Litvack, Eisner,
and Russell-essentially by contending, for the first time, that the
business judgment rule was unavailable to officers.' 6 The Delaware
Supreme Court ruled that the argument had not been timely made

10. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 7, at 1600-01.
11. Id.; see also Z. Jill Barclift, Senior Corporate Officers and the Duty of
Candor:Do the CEO and CFO Have a Duty to Inform?, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 269,

270 (2006); DeMott, supra note 5.
12. Johnson & Millon, supra note 7, at 1600 n.10; Aaron D. Jones,
Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and the FiduciaryDuties of Corporate Officers
Under Delaware Law, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 475 (2007).
13. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment

Rule, 60 Bus. LAw. 439, 443 (2005).
14. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 771-72 (Del. Ch.
2005). Bollenbach, although an officer because he served as CFO, did not act on
the Ovitz employment matter as an officer, instead acting only in his capacity
as a director. Id. at 771 n.560. Litvack and Eisner, although also directors,
acted on the Ovitz matter in their officer capacity as well. Id.
15. Id. at 777 n.588 ("The parties essentially treat both officers and
directors as comparable fiduciaries, that is, subject to the same fiduciary duties
and standards of substantive review. Thus, for purposes of this case, theories of
liability against corporate directors apply equally to corporate officers, making
further distinctions unnecessary.").
16. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 36, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006), availableat http://entrepreneur.typepad.com
conglomerate/disney/Appellants l.pdf ("[T]he business judgment rule does not
apply to Eisner or Litvack acting as officers or to Russell acting as Eisner's
personal 'gratuitous agent.'").
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at trial and therefore sidestepped the issue.1 7 Consequently, these
critical issues remain unresolved, but undoubtedly in future cases
they will be vigorously pressed by plaintiffs' lawyers well aware that
in Delaware (like most states), officers, unlike directors, may not be
exculpated from personal liability for damages.'8 In addition, officers
may be held to a standard of ordinary, not gross, negligence, '9 the
standard often applied to directors. Moreover, the key question of
whether officers are subject to an emergent duty of good faith
likewise remains unresolved, though to be sure, both the Chancery
Court and Supreme Court opinions assessed the good faith of Eisner
and Litvack acting as Disney officers. ° Neither tribunal, however,
squarely ruled that officers as such are subject to such a duty or
whether the contours of any such duty would be the same as those
for directors. 2'
Greater conversance with the rationales, theory, and scope of
officer fiduciary duties can sharpen legal analysis once a dispute is
in litigation and can also guide lawyers in counseling officers in an
effort to avoid litigation.2 2 A recent, high-profile case involving
former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's lawsuit against

17. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 46 n.38 (Del.
2006).
18. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (directors but not officers
may be exculpated from personal liability for breaching the duty of due care).
19. Johnson & Millon, supra note 7, at 1600.
20. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 72 (Del. 2006); In
re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 763 (Del. Ch. 2005).
21. In November 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that good
faith is not an independent fiduciary duty, but is a subsidiary element of the
duty of loyalty. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). The court also
stated that the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving
conflicts of interest, Id., a position advocated by Professor Johnson several years
ago. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in
CorporateLaw, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 27 (2003) (arguing that loyalty includes

a "nonbetrayal" dimension addressing conflicts of interest and also a more
affirmative "devotion" dimension). For an insightful assessment of Stone and
what it means for the meaning of good faith, see Sarah Helene Duggin &
Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: The Disney
Standard and the "New" Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 211 (2006). These

developments on good faith in the director context sharpen the point addressed
in this Article: what does all this mean for the fiduciary duties of corporate
officers?
22. Another current setting where this arises is when senior officers use
their knowledge and influence to work with private equity firms to formulate
buyout proposals. See In re SS & C Techs., Inc. Sholders Litig., 911 A.2d 816,
817, 820 (Del. Ch. 2006) (disapproving a proposed settlement and raising
questions about the CEO's conduct in litigation growing out of management-led
buyout).
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former New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) CEO Richard Grasso
highlights this point.2 3 In granting Spitzer's motion for partial
summary judgment on a claim that Grasso breached his fiduciary
duty to the NYSE by not making certain disclosures about his
retirement package to the board, Judge Charles Ramos easily could
have relied on clear and settled agency law principles applicable to
Grasso as CEO in dealing with his principal, the NYSE.24 These
principles, well articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Agency,
require that Grasso comply with duties of competence, diligence,
and loyalty, as well as adhere to a duty to provide information and a
duty of good conduct.25 An agent dealing with his principal must
both disclose material facts to the principal, unless the principal has
manifested that such facts are already known or are not desired,
and deal "fairly" even after disclosure.26
Judge Ramos instead cited a statutory care standard
applicable in New York, which had relatively little bearing on a selfdealing transaction, and general fiduciary principles applicable in a
conflict setting.27 He even, on one occasion, discussed the fiduciary
duty of a board member, 28 even though Grasso was clearly acting in
his capacity as CEO in the matter, not as a director.
Even more interesting for our project-but unknown-is the
question of whether Grasso was ever specifically advised by a lawyer
concerning his fiduciary duties as CEO in dealing with the board on
this significant matter. Whether the advice, if given or sought,
would have been followed also is, of course, unknown. Frequently,
there is tension between what should be disclosed to a board of
directors and what management wants disclosed. It is possible,
however, that a bit of preventive legal medicine by a knowledgeable,
proactive lawyer could have avoided this litigation altogether by
firmly recommending that Grasso make full and timely disclosure of
all pertinent details. As noted in Comment 2 to Model Rule 1.6,
"lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given."29 We
believe that this is one of potentially numerous instances where, if
23. Spitzer v. Grasso, No. 401620/04, 2006 WL 3016952, at *1 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 18, 2006).
24. Id. at *31.
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFAGENCY §§ 8.06, 8.08, 8.10, 8.11 (2006).
26. Id. § 8.06 (2006). Recent revisions to the Model Business Corporation
Act affirmatively require all officers to inform a superior officer or the board of
directors, or a committee thereof, of information known to the officer to be
material to the superior officer, board, or committee. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
8.42(b)(1) (2005).
27. Spitzer, 2006 WL 3016952, at *28-29.
28. Id. at *31.
29.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2003).
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officers were clearly advised as to their fiduciary duties, greater
certainty and propriety could be brought to corporate dealings. We
further believe this practice bears on officer conduct over a wide
range of matters, not simply where they are proposing to "deal" with
the company.
Scholars and lawyers vehemently disagree, to be sure, as to
whether officers should be held to duties that are the same as, or
stricter than, those of directors, and as to whether the business
judgment rule should apply to officers with the same full force with
which it applies to directors." What apparently is not controversial,
however, is that officers owe fiduciary duties of some sort, at least
equivalent to those owed by directors, if not the stricter duties owed
under agency law. Consequently, we set out to ascertain what, if
anything, experienced lawyers were saying to officers about
fiduciary duties.
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON LAWYERS ADVISING OFFICERS

Survey Methodology and Research
The primary sources of information for this Article are lawyers.
Information was derived from lawyer responses to a questionnaire
asking several questions about how they give fiduciary duty advice.
A copy of the questionnaire is attached as Appendix A. In the
interest of protecting confidentiality, lawyers were promised
complete anonymity in the reporting of findings. Follow-up phone
interviews were conducted in two instances, at the suggestion of the
respondents. Information also was derived from research on how
several law firms use their websites to describe the sorts of fiduciary
duty advice they provide in the corporate setting. We do identify the
law firms from which website information was gathered.
Fiduciary duty advice surveys were sent to corporate lawyers in
The
major metropolitan areas throughout the United States.
lawyers to whom we sent the survey included corporate partners at
various U.S. law firms, in-house counsel for U.S. corporations, and
A.

30. Compare Johnson & Millon, supra note 7, at 1642-43 (arguing against
the business judgment rule applying to officer conduct), and Johnson, supra
note 13, at 440 (same), with Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III,
Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor
Johnson, 60 Bus. LAW. 865, 868 (2005) (arguing business judgment rule should
apply to corporate officers). See also Answering Brief of non-Ovitz DefendantsBelow, Appellees, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. at 55-56, 906 A.2d 27
(Del. 2005), available at http://entrepreneur.typepad.com/conglomerate/
disney/NonOvitz.pdf (arguing that both numerous dicta and strong policy
considerations suggest that the business judgment rule should apply to both
officers and directors).
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other lawyers active in the corporate law community. We sent the
survey to slightly over one hundred lawyers.
Responses from
seventeen of those lawyers are analyzed in this Article. Sixteen of
the respondents practice in law firms, and one respondent practices
as in-house general counsel for a corporation.
Of the sixteen
respondents practicing at law firms, five practice at firms with fewer
than two hundred and fifty lawyers, three practice at firms with two
hundred and fifty to five hundred lawyers, five practice at firms
with five hundred to one thousand lawyers, and three practice at
firms with over one thousand lawyers. The responding lawyers
practice in the following cities: Palo Alto, California; Washington,
D.C.; Wilmington, Delaware; Miami, Florida;
Minneapolis,
Minnesota; New York, New York; and Richmond, Virginia. We
recognize the risk of "nonresponse bias," but we regard the survey
study as more in the nature of an informative pilot project than as
an exhaustive and definitive study. Moreover, the website research
described below serves as a check on the possibility of nonresponse
bias, as well as being informative in its own right.
This Article also analyzes how law firms use their websites to
describe the nature of fiduciary duty advice they offer in the
corporate setting. Fifteen law firm websites were analyzed. The
firms all practice corporate law and represent clients in cities
throughout the United States and abroad. We conducted research
on the websites of the following law firms: Akin, Gump, Strauss,
Hauer & Feld LLP; Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP; Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton LLP; Fenwick & West LLP; Fulbright &
Jaworski LLP; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP; Goodwin Procter
LLP; Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabkin PC;
Hunton & Williams LLP; Jones Day; Morrison & Foerster LLP;
Perkins Coie LLP; Potter, Anderson & Corroon LLP; Simpson,
Thacher & Bartlett LLP; and Weil, Gotshal, & Manges LLP.
B.

Findingsand Analysis

Results from the survey and website research suggest that
many corporate lawyers do not regularly provide fiduciary duty
advice to officers in their capacity as officers. The results also reveal
that if fiduciary duty advice is provided to officers, it is usually very
similar to, or the same as, advice provided to directors. While
lawyers often advise officers who also serve as directors, the advice
provided in these situations is based on the officer's status as a
director.
One of the questions from our fiduciary duty survey asked the
lawyers whether or not they advise officers as to their fiduciary
duties in their capacity as officers. Only two of the seventeen
respondents indicated that they provide officer-specific fiduciary
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duty advice to officers in all relevant settings.
Another six
respondents indicated that they provide officer-specific fiduciary
duty advice in various settings. Two respondents were on the
opposite end of the spectrum, indicating that they never advise
officers as to their fiduciary duties.3 1 Another four respondents only
advise those officers who also serve on the board, and they
apparently advise them in their capacity as directors. One lawyer
responded that whether he or she advises officers "depends on the
circumstances," with no further elaboration, although a follow-up
phone interview revealed that such advice has been infrequently
given. Another lawyer replied that it is not typical to advise officers
who are not also directors, but that it varies from case to case. One
respondent indicated that officers have been advised in some
transactional settings and are also advised as to corporate
opportunities and the process relating to the dismissal of officers.
Overall, then, eleven of the respondents advise officers as to
their fiduciary duties at least occasionally, though several do so less
regularly than they advise directors as to their duties. Setting aside
the two respondents who never advise officers and the four
respondents who advise only those officers who are also directors
(and who apparently advise them in their capacity as directors), we
also found that among the eleven respondents who, at least in some
circumstances, advise officers, most offer advice to the effect that
officer fiduciary duties are the same as director duties.32 Therefore,
even though this issue remains unsettled under Delaware law-as
noted in Part I-lawyers are providing advice as if the issue has
been resolved.
There is some variation in this pattern, however.
One
respondent stated that it is not clear that the business judgment
rule applies to officers and also stated that the duties "probably play
out differently (i.e., tougher liability triggers)" for those who run the
business day-to-day and have full access to corporate information.
Another stated, without elaboration, that the duty of care is not an
issue for officers, although it is an issue for directors. Another
respondent added that officers have a duty to keep directors and
superior officers informed. Another respondent indicated that the
little case law on the subject indicated that officer and director
duties are "similar," but that there is little law as to where those

31. One of the negative respondents, although giving a detailed response on
how he or she advises directors, said advising officers "doesn't really come up;"
the other said that while he or she "does not give separate advice to officers
outside of board counseling," he or she believes others in his or her firm do.
32. One of the lawyers, for example, simply did a cut and paste of his or her
responses to the same questions regarding directors.
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duties might differ. The same respondent reported that he or she
specifically advised that section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General
Corporate Law offered no exculpatory protection to officers acting as
officers. One respondent, who invited a telephone interview to
follow up, indicated that although officers as agents might face a
tougher liability standard, that possibility does not alter how officers
are counseled and does not affect how lawyerly advice as to the
business judgment rule's applicability is phrased. This respondent
also stated that fiduciary duties are not as meaningful to officers as
they are to directors, given that officers have more ongoing
connections to the company. We find, overall, that those lawyers
who do offer fiduciary duty advice to officers do not offer
significantly different advice to officers, as compared to the advice
given to directors.
A theoretically correct approach to the rationale for, and scope
of, officer fiduciary duties may be to ground officer duties in agency
law principles. 3 Only one lawyer out of the seventeen corporate
lawyers responding to the survey mentioned that officers should
receive different fiduciary duty advice because "as the officers are
delegated their authority by the board there is also more agency
theory applicable to their duties and accountability." Even this
respondent hedged his or her response by saying that the "basic"
fiduciary responsibilities remain the same. Until courts announce
clearer standards for analyzing officer-specific fiduciary duties,
lawyers apparently will advise officers as to how they think courts
currently are treating them, even if the case law is sparse, and even
if lawyers believe the law should be analyzed differently.
For the most part, of those lawyers responding that they did
provide different advice for officers than directors, the advice was
not substantially different. One lawyer responded that the bigger
issue with officers is the duty of loyalty and good faith, not the duty
of care, giving examples such as misappropriation of corporate
This
information and the taking of corporate opportunities.
response is probably more an observation on the settings where
actual officer fiduciary duty problems arise, rather than truly
differentiating officer duties from those of directors. Another lawyer
stated that officers "have the further duty to understand what tasks
have been delegated to them and to keep the board or a superior
officer informed as to matters which they believe such superiors
have a need to know in order to do their jobs." This response also
shows how the lawyer thinks officers should conduct themselves in
complying with their fiduciary duties, and while it does not
necessarily indicate a belief that officer duties are different than
33. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 7, at 1601.
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those of directors, it does highlight both the subordinate position of
officers in relation to the board and their duty to disclose key
information.
Finally, one lawyer responded that officers are
"trustees of the corporation," and as such, officers should "disclose
all relationships" and "do what they believe is right."
As for the results of our study into how law firms use their
websites to describe how (or to whom) they provide fiduciary duty
advice, results similarly show that 'aw firms, at least based on what
they say they do, are not frequently advising officers as to their
fiduciary duties in their capacity as officers.
Law firm web
publications regarding fiduciary duties are almost exclusively
geared toward advising directors. A search for "fiduciary duties" on
the Weil, Gotshal, and Manges LLP website, for example, resulted
in one hundred and twenty-one publication hits. 34 While at least
seventeen of the publications are designed to advise directors as to
their fiduciary duties, and one to advise controlling shareholders,
only one publication
is designed to advise officers as to their
S 35
fiduciary duties. The lone publication warns management teams to
remember their fiduciary duties in going private transactions.
A
search for keywords "fiduciary duties" on the "Legal Updates &
News" section of the Morrison & Foerster LLP website resulted in
forty-two hits.
While a handful of the legal updates provide
fiduciary duty advice for directors, none advise officers as to their
fiduciary duties. Similar results occur in a search of the Fulbright &
Jaworski LLP website. 38 Apparently these firms either do not advise
officers as part of their practice or they believe the risk of a court
finding an officer liable for breach of his or her fiduciary duties is so
remote compared to the risk of a director being held liable that
officer-specific fiduciary duties are not mentioned in written
materials.
Besides not gearing fiduciary duty advice toward officers in the
publications, news releases, and client alerts or memos posted on

34. See Weil, Gotshal, & Manges LLP website search results for
"fiduciary
duties,"
www.weil.com/wgn/pages/Controller.jsp?z=s&sz=ss&f=
fiduciary%20and%20duties&db=wgm/cwgmpubs.nsf (last visited Jul. 13, 2007).
35. Id.
36. Christopher Machera, Warning Shots, PRIVATE EQUITY ALERT (Weil,
Gotshal & Manges LLP), Dec. 2006, at 6, http://www.weil.com/wgm/
cwgmhomep.nsf/Files/PEADecO6/$file/PEADec06.pdf.
37. See Morrison & Foerster LLP website search results for
"fiduciary duties," http://search.atomz.com/search/?sp-q=fiduciary+duties&spk=Legal+Updates+and+News&sp-a=splOO38afa&sp-p=all&sp-f=ISO-8859-1
(last visited Jul. 13, 2007).
38. See Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?
fuseaction=search.results (last visited Jul. 13, 2007).
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law firm websites, the actual content of the postings addressing
fiduciary duties lacks any reference to officer-specific fiduciary
duties. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP ("Akin Gump") put
out a "Corporate Governance Alert" in response to the Disney
decision in August of 2005. 3 9 The publication does not mention that
Chancellor Chandler analyzed the fiduciary duties of Disney
officers.40 Akin Gump only mentions officers once, and that instance
is to advise directors to make sure the officers keep them "fully
informed on a timely basis of significant corporate developments. '
A Hunton & Williams LLP "Client Alert" in response to the Disney
decision similarly fails to address officer issues. 42 The fc
fact that Akin
Gump and Hunton & Williams apparently are not thinking of
officers in the context of fiduciary duty advice is seen by reading the
titles of the client alerts regarding the Disney decision. The Akin
Gump alert states "Directors Did Not Breach,"43 and the Hunton &
Williams alert says "Delaware Chancery Addresses Directors'
Fiduciary Duties."" On the other hand, the title of a Simpson,
Thacher & Bartlett LLP client release looked more promising for
finding officer-specific fiduciary duty information or advice. The
45
February 2006 piece is titled "Directors' and Officers' Liability.,
Despite including officers in the title, however, the release provides
no officer-specific fiduciary duty advice.46 The law firm of Jones Day
does provide some officer-specific fiduciary duty advice. One of the
publications posted on the Jones Day website addresses how the
duty of good faith may affect both directors and officers.
In one
section, the authors warn that "although the cases discussed below
have addressed good faith in the context of directors' conduct, it
39. AKIN, GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ALERT: THE DISNEY DECISION: DELAWARE CHANCERY COURT FINDS DIRECTORS DID
NOT BREACH FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN CONNECTION WITH HIRING AND FIRING OF
MICHAEL OVITZ (2005), http://www.akingump.com/docs/publication/795.pdf.

40. Id.
41. Id. at 3-4.
42.

HUNTON

ADDRESSES

&

WILLIAMS

LLP,

DIRECTORS' FIDUCIARY

CLIENT

DUTIES

IN

ALERT:
WALT

DELAWARE
DISNEY

CHANCERY

CASE

(2005),

http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s lONews/FileUpload44/12093/DisneyClientAle
rt.pdf.
43. See AKIN, GUMP, STRAUSS,HAUER & FELD LLP, supra note 39, at 1.
44. See HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, supra note 42, at 1.
45. Joseph M. McLaughlin, Directors' and Officers' Liability: Good Faith:A

New Sheriff in Town?, SIMPSON, THACHER, & BARTLET LLP, Feb. 9, 2006,
http://www.stblaw.com/content/publications/pub537.pdf.
46. See id.
47. Mark E. Betzen & Jeffrey D. Litle, Good Faith Issues PresentNew Risks
for Directors and Officers, JONES DAY COMMENTARIES, February 2005,
www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs-detail.aspx?publD=S 129.
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would be prudent to assume that the conduct of officers would be
subject to similar legal analyses." 8 This seems to be appropriate
advice, at least until case law rules otherwise.
A few observations about how lawyers advise as to the duty of
good faith are in order, given that that duty has attracted great
attention in recent years, 9 and even though the Delaware Supreme
Court recently subsumed good faith within the duty of loyalty in
Stone.5 ° Although the survey-sent after the Chancery Court
opinion in Disney, but before the Supreme Court opinions in Disney
and Stone-did not specifically ask lawyers whether they advise
officers about the emergent duty of good faith, their responses to
that issue in the director context are revealing.
No common method appears to exist among lawyers for advising
directors (and perhaps officers as well) as to what the duty of good
faith means. This is no doubt related to the current lack of clear
guidance from case law as to the reach and contours of that duty.
While courts consistently speak about the duties of care and loyalty,
occasionally finding directors liable for breaching the latter duty,
courts offer no clear or succinct definition of the duty of good faith
and, so far, almost never hold directors liable solely on the basis of a
breach of the duty of good faith. 5' One view of the duty of good faith
among lawyers is that it is subsumed within the duties of care and
loyalty, precisely as the Delaware Supreme Court recently ruled in
Stone.2 This point of view may reflect what lawyers are taking from
recent case law, such as the recent Disney opinions, which
recognizes the duty of good faith, but does not clearly address its
relationship to the duty of loyalty. 3 Not surprisingly, six of the
lawyers responding to our survey believe that the duty of good faith
is somehow subsumed within or made irrelevant by the duties of
care and loyalty. This view apparently is based on the opinion that
acting in good faith is a necessary prerequisite for complying with,

48. Id. at 2.
49. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63-64 n.99
(Del. 2006) (listing scholarly articles devoted to the concept of good faith).
50. See supra note 21.
51. But see ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006
WL 3783520, at *23 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (holding directors liable for breach
of fiduciary duty); In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A.
16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *39 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004) (holding a director
liable to the corporation's shareholders for breach of his fiduciary duty of loyalty
and good faith). See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. 907 A.2d
693, 753-56 (discussing case law regarding the duty of good faith).
52. See supra note 21.
53. See In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 753; In re Walt Disney Co., 906

A.2d at 67 n.112.
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or is a component of, those duties. As stated in Disney, the failure to
act in good faith would mean a failure to comply with the duty of
loyalty and could lead to liability.M Several law firms, along this
line, advise directors that the duty of good faith is subsumed under
the duties of care and loyalty. A legal update on the Fulbright &
Jaworski LLP website" and a "Clients and Friends Memo" from
Cadwalader 56 both tie the duty of good faith to the duties of care and
loyalty. The Cadwalader piece cites the 2005 Disney Chancery
Court opinion, stating that the duty of good faith is not an
independent duty, "but rather that the obligation to act in good faith
and necessarily
overarches all fiduciary duties and 'is inseparably
57
intertwined with the duties of care and loyalty.'

A more traditional view of the duty of good faith is that it
requires directors to act honestly, 58 in the best interest of the
corporation, 9 and in a manner that is not knowingly unlawful or
contrary to public policy. 60

Three lawyers, along this line, stated

simply that they believe meeting the duty of good faith requires
directors to "act in the best interests of the corporation." Acting in
the corporation's best interests is a proper and useful statement,
and while it is important advice that should be given to all directors
(and officers, we believe), simply telling a director to act in the best
interests of the corporation may not be enough to avoid liability in
this current corporate climate.
Under Chancellor Chandler's
standard in Disney for complying with the duty of good faith,
consciously disregarding directorial responsibilities would also
constitute a breach of the duty of good faith and could lead to
personal liability.6 1 Therefore, if a director consciously disregards
some responsibilities, he or she may think, subjectively, that he or
she is still acting "in the best interests of the corporation," but could
nonetheless be liable for breaching the duty of good faith.
54. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 753 n.447.
55. CARL E. KAPLAN & BETH MAZZOGErrI, FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP,
LEGAL UPDATE: DUTY OF CARE: DELAWARE DIRECTORS BE CAREFUL (2004),

www.fulbright.com/images/publications/ACF1194.pdf.
56. CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFr LLP, CLIENTS & FRIENDS MEMO: THE
DISNEY DECISION 1, 5-6 (2005), http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client-friend/

081605DisneyDecision.pdf.
57. Id. at 2.
58. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 753 (citing E. Norman Veasey,
Reflections on Key Issues of the Responsibilities of CorporateLawyers in the 21"
Century, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 9 (2003)).
59. Id. at 754 (citing In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Sholder Litig., CIV. A. No.
10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989)).
60. Id. at 755 (citing Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051
n.2 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
61. Id. at 755.
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Four lawyers mentioned that recent Delaware court decisions
suggest that the duty of good faith may be analyzed as a stand-alone
duty. Given that our survey was sent during the fall of 2005, these
lawyers may be taking a cue from Chandler's Disney opinion where
the Chancellor notes that the conduct in the case occurred before
Enron and the spate of corporate scandals, so fiduciary duties may
62
Th
The Emerging
be viewed differently in future cases.
Communications case also suggests that Delaware courts may be
leaning toward using the duty
•63 of good faith as a doctrinal basis for
Some lawyers apparently are
imposing liability on directors.
responding to these cases by warning their clients of heightened
risks. Three of the lawyers responding to the survey advise clients
that breaches of the duty of good faith are significant given that
Delaware law does not protect directors from personal liability for
A posting on the Jones Day website cautions
such breaches.6
directors and officers that courts may consider the duty of good faith
as a stand-alone duty.65 The commentary reasons that courts may
use the duty of good faith to impose liability on directors and officers
since indemnification and insurance protections usually do not apply
for non-good faith breaches.6 6 Similar cautionary advice about good
faith is provided by Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP and by Morrison
& Foerster LLP. A November 2004 "Corporate and Securities Law
Update" from Fenwick & West LLP warned that the Emerging

62. Id. at 697.
63. See In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415,
2004 WL 1305745, at *43 (Del. Ch. 2004). In holding directors liable for breach
of loyalty and good faith, Vice Chancellor, now Justice, Jacobs stated that:
Although the Supreme Court has yet to define the precise conduct
that would actionably violate [the duty of good faith], this Court has
recently held that directors can be found to have violated their duty of
good faith if they 'consciously and intentionally disregardO their
responsibilities,' adopting a 'we don't care about the risks' attitude
concerning a material corporate decision.
Id. (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch.
2003)).
64. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
65. Mark E. Betzen & Jeffrey D. Litle, Good Faith Issues
DAY
for
Directors and Officers, JONES
Risks
Present New
February 2005, http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/
e029fOal-80f8-4df8-ab8e- 7193dafc977c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
e7d2af65-19b0-4dc4-ba2d-6754ee945d6d/Good%20Faith%20Issues.pdf.
66. Id.
67. See GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, THE DIRECTOR SETTLEMENTS AT
ENRON AND WORLDCOM; LESSONS FOR DIRECTORS (2005), http://www.gibsondunn.com/
MORRISON FOERSTER
practices/publications/detaiVid/766/?pubItemId=7701;
LLP, BOARDROOM "BEST" PRACTICES ARE CHANGING: THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE
COMMENTARIES,

"GOOD" FAITH (2003), http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update1078.html.
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Communications case "raised the bar for a showing of good faith
68
director conduct that will be sufficient to avoid director liability."
Postings on the Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP website warn that
plaintiffs may be encouraged to bring more suits against directors
for breaches of the duty of good faith.69 One of the postings
concludes that the duty of good faith "functions as a 'safety valve' to
capture conduct by disinterested directors that is aberrational or
that amounts to an abdication of their duty to oversee the business
affairs of the corporation.""° On June 9, 2006, one day after the
Delaware Supreme Court decided the Disney case, Potter, Anderson
& Corroon LLP posted an article stating that the Court's opinion
"clarifies the duty of directors to act in good faith."" These firms all
seem concerned that although recent trends in the Delawarprourts
are providing useful clarity to corporate decision makers, th*rend
is also giving plaintiffs clearer standards for bringing claims against
corporate directors (and possibly officers) for breaching the duty of
good faith.
IV.

REASONS FOR ADVISING OFFICERS ABOUT FIDUCIARY DUTIES

We do not know why more lawyers do not routinely advise
senior corporate officers as to their fiduciary duties. Failure to do so
may be an example of "omission bias." Actors may be less likely to
be held responsible for failures to act than for affirmative acts,72 and
they may experience less regret from adverse consequences flowing
from inaction.73 But the key issue is why lawyers do not act on this
matter. One possible explanation is that outside legal counsel,

68.

FENWICK & WEST LLP, CORPORATE

&

SECURITIES LAW UPDATE:

M&A

DEVELOPMENT: COuRT FINDS FINANCIALLY SOPHISTICATED DIRECTOR PERSONALLY

LIABLE FOR $77 MILLION (2004), http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/

Corporate/sec/CorpSecl 1-09-04.pdf.
69. John F. Grossbauer & Nancy M. Waterman, The (No Longer)
Overlooked Duty of Good Faith Under Delaware Law, DEAL POINTS (Potter,

Anderson & Corroon LLP), Summer 2003, http://www.potteranderson.com/
news-publications-40-48.html.
70.

MICHAEL B. TuMAS, MARK A. MORTON & DAVID S. PHILLIPS, POTTER
CORROON LLP, THE OMNIPRESENT SPECTER OF THE DUTY OF

ANDERSON &
GOOD

FAITH:

Do

DIRECTORS

HAVE

REASON

TO

WORRY

(2005),

http://www.potteranderson.com/news-publications-40-32.html.
71. Potter, Anderson & Corroon LLP, Disney Affirmed: The Delaware
Supreme Court Clarifies the Duty of Directors to Act in Good Faith (June 9,
2006), http://www.potteranderson.comnews-firm-42.html.
72. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 7; Arthur B. Laby, Resolving
Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 130-31

(2004).
73. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage Unethical Conduct in the
Securities Industry?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 765, 789 (2006).

20071

(NOT)ADVISING CORPORATE OFFICERS

679

representing the corporation itself, may believe they are to advise
only directors, not officers. If that is so-and we do not accept the
propriety of that position-the obvious question is who, if anyone, is
or should be advising officers? Possibly, in-house legal counsel is
doing so, 4 although they too represent the company itself, not the
officers, notwithstanding the fact that they work closely with senior
officers and are themselves business advisors in many respects.75
The question as to what in-house lawyers do on this subject
certainly warrants further empirical research. One reason why inhouse counsel might be well suited for advising officers about their
duties is the fact that they do work closely with officers. In addition,
as Professor John Coffee has noted in advocating that lawyers serve
as "gatekeepers," in-house counsel are often more "knowledgeable"
about company affairs (past and present), information networks,
and mores than outside counsel, and are "uniquely positioned to
specialize in preventive law."76 A corollary to this is that outside
counsel, although more independent, frequently serve as more
narrowly focused "transactional engineers" than "wise counselors."77
Furthermore, as pointed out by Professor Robert Gordon, 8 a large
corporation may employ many outside law firms (Enron used more
than one hundred), thereby making it very difficult for any one
lawyer (or law firm) to have a complete understanding of a client's
74. In a September 29, 2006, conversation with TIAA-CREF General
Counsel, George W. Madison, at a Columbia Law School Conference on Gate
Keepers, Mr. Madison told one of the authors that he believed in-house counsel
typically would advise corporate officers as to their fiduciary duties. One of our
respondents, however, who is an in-house general counsel, reported that he or
she only advised officers as to their duties if they also were directors. See also
E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, and
ProfessionalResponsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation,62 Bus. LAW. 1,

5-8 (2006) (describing the multiple roles played by-and multiple demands
placed on-general counsel).
75. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2003) ("A lawyer

employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents.") (emphasis added).
76. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 195 (2006). But see Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1
BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 119 (2006) (arguing that lawyers as

"dependent" gatekeepers are less prone than "independent" gatekeepers to offer
robust monitoring due to unconscious accountability and commitment biases).
These biases, creating allegiance to client interests in dealing with third
parties, do not explain why lawyers acting loyally would not tell officers that
they have fiduciary duties, nor do they explain why, as developed below,
lawyers may be shirking their responsibilities to their own clients.
77.

COFFEE, supra note 76.

78. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor
After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2003).
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present affairs or its upcoming plans. Gordon goes on to argue that
Enron's reputable outside counsel did not seriously challenge Enron
officers on dubious transactions.7 9
On the other hand, in-house counsel face challenges in this role
as well. A key challenge is the simple fact that in-house legal
counsel are financially dependent on the corporate client for their
livelihoods. Moreover, as Gordon notes, general counsel may be in
somewhat the same position as outside counsel if a corporation
employs many lawyers in-house, especially if various operating
divisions or areas have their own lawyers providing legal services."o
Still, general counsel could pointedly direct such subordinate
counsel to offer fiduciary duty advice to those managers with whom
they work closely. Another impediment for in-house counsel is that,
as Coffee points out, they themselves are business managers. 8 '
Furthermore, almost forty percent of general counsel do not report
to the CEO and therefore may not have frequent, ongoing access to
the CEO.8 2 Their dealings with senior officers simply may not be as
"regularized" as dealings with directors, but may instead be more
transaction- or situation-dependent.83 Those in-house counsel who
do work closely with senior officers, Professor William Simon
argues, often wrongly equate the interests of management with
those of the company, perhaps in part because they also serve as
business advisors, not just as legal counsel. " Serving in both a
"business" and "legal" capacity can create a sense of role conflict
wherein counsel is, in part, both lawyer and client.8 5 Finally,
79. Id. at 1193, 1202. See DANIEL

YANKELOVICH, PROFIT WITH HONOR
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(2006) (quoting from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Corporate
Responsibility Steering Committee report that "the failure of ...gatekeepers
was a recurrent theme in the business scandals.").
80. See Gordon, supra note 78, at 1202-03 (describing the increasing
fragmentation of in-house counsel).
81. COFFEE, supra note 76, at 225.
82. Id.
83. E-mail from William Goodell, Attorney, (Oct. 30, 2006) (on file with
author). Mr. Goodell did not participate in the survey of attorneys; see also Carl
D. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L. J. 1201, 1208
(1997).
84. William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization'sLawyer
Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REV. 57, 64 (2003).
85. Id. at 60, 64-65, 76-77; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J.
Johnson, Managerialism,Legal Ethics and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 307 (2004) (arguing that the need of in-house counsel to
please management will lead them to avoid pursuing management wrongdoing).
The desire to please management can, of course, apply to outside counsel as
well. See supra note 78 and accompanying text; Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice
as Moral Perspective, 19 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225, 241-42 (2006) (noting

Enron's lawyers were uncritical adopters of managerial perspective).
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although large public companies often have in-house lawyers, 6 the
vast majority of corporations do not. Consequently, in light of these
concerns about in-house counsel, outside counsel must play an
important, if not exclusive, role in providing fiduciary advice to
officers or suggest that officers employ their own lawyers to do so, or
such advice simply may not be given.
A strong argument can be made that legal counsel for the
corporation should, as part of that representation, advise corporate
officers as to the scope and upshot of their fiduciary duties. The
board of directors is, statutorily,87 ultimately responsible for
directing the business and affairs of the corporation. In addition, in
order to fulfill its own fiduciary duty of care, the board must
discharge its duty of oversight.88 Although typically associated with
ensuring the implementation and healthy functioning of an internal
information and financial reporting system, proper oversight also
entails ensuring corporate compliance with applicable laws.8 9 One
aspect of discharging that responsibility, especially given that vast
authority typically is delegated by the board to senior officers, 90
should include taking appropriate measures to fully advise senior
officers both as to their fiduciary status in relation to the
corporation and as to the broad nature and scope of the fiduciary
duties that flow out of that status. In other words, to truly
discharge their own statutory and fiduciary responsibilities to the
corporation and its stockholders, directors must see to it that senior
officers fully understand their own fiduciary duties. Doing so is no
less important, in our view, than advising officers about their need
to comply with, for example, insider trading prohibitions and other
specific statutory regimes such as the antitrust laws or
environmental regulations.
The obvious candidate for fulfilling this gatekeeping, or more
86. See
87.

COFFEE, supra note 76, at 223.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §

8.01(c)(3) (2005) (specifying that board of director oversight responsibilities

include attention to "the performance and compensation of senior officers").
88. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968-69 (Del.
Ch. 1996).
89.

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §

8.01(c)(4) (2005) (specifying that board of

director oversight responsibility extends to "policies and practices to foster the
corporation's compliance with law and ethical conduct"); see also Lyman
Johnson, MisunderstandingDirector Duties: The Strange Case of Virginia, 56

WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1127, 1138-40 (1999) (arguing that lawyers should
"strongly urge client boards to study and implement measures to monitor and
report on their corporations' compliance with applicable legal regimes and other
governing standards of sound business performance").
90. 1
PRINCIPLES
OF
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE:
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02 at 89 (Am. Law Inst. 1994).

ANALYSIS

AND
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broadly, "counseling" function is legal counsel,9" whether in-house or
outside. Counsel must initiate this process because, first of all,
directors themselves most likely will not attend to it on their own.
Moreover, doing so may be imperative if lawyers are to fulfill their
own fiduciary and professional responsibilities to the organizational
client. Put another way, not advising senior officers as to the
fiduciary duties they owe to the corporation may represent
professional negligence in representing the interests of the
corporation. A lawyer, of course, has a duty to represent a client
with ordinary care and prudence,92 and a lawyer with special skill or
expertise must bring that expertise and skill to bear in the
representation.93 Also, although not always sharply distinguishable
from a legal malpractice theory, 94 lawyers owe clients a fiduciary
duty that, if breached, may result in liability.9 5
Imagine, for example, that a corporate officer breaches his or
her fiduciary duty in a way that causes damage to the company.
The board of directors may choose to have the company absorb the
loss and elect to sanction the officer in some other fashion, perhaps
by demotion or termination. The board, or investors by means of a
derivative suit, could, however, initiate an action against the officer
for breach of fiduciary duty. If the officer is found liable, the usual
unavailability of statutory exculpation for corporate officers means
there is no statutory shield to protect the officer.96 But does the
officer, through personal assets or liability insurance, have the
financial means to fully compensate the company for the damages

91. Professor Coffee refers to the lawyerly function of helping clients
comply with law as a "modest form of gate keeping." COFFEE, supra note 76, at
193. We are uncertain why he describes it as "modest."
92.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 1.1, 1.3;

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

§ 8.02 (2006); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 16(2),
48, 52 (2000).
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006).
94. Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Duty Breach as
Legal Malpractice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 689, 691 (2006).
95. Id.; Rhode, supra note 8, at 1319 ("[L]awyers, as fiduciaries for clients,
have a moral obligation to provide informed, independent, and disinterested
legal advice. Although this obligation is widely accepted in theory, it is too
seldom realized in practice."); see also Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 82 (3d Cir.
2006) (finding it elementary that every lawyer owes each client a duty of
loyalty). The requirement of lawyer independence was recently discussed by
former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court E. Norman Veasey and
Christine Di Guglielmo. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo supra note 74, at 8-11.
96. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Moreover, in order to be
eligible for indemnification from the corporation, an officer must act in good
faith. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001). It is in the interests of officers,
therefore, that they understand what "good faith" means.
AGENCY
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caused? If not, then the corporation-even apart from any duty to
indemnify the officer-will ultimately foot the bill for the officer's
wrongdoing. The corporation obviously has been damaged, perhaps
because the officer simply did not know9 7-because he or she was
never advised-that officers must fulfill certain fiduciary duties.
Lawyers must not simply assume either that officers understand
these duties or that it is someone else's responsibility to advise them
concerning those duties.
Lawyers not only must comply with the applicable tort law
standards of professional care, they must, to fulfill their ethical
duties to the corporate client, competently and diligently represent
the client. 98 When representing an organizational client, moreover,
the lawyer must be aware that this client can only act through
others. They are the "duly authorized constituents" through which
the organization acts. 99 It is especially critical, therefore, that the
lawyer advise those senior officers whose conduct is most vital to the
organization's well being that they are fiduciaries owing robust
fiduciary duties. Along this line, Model Rule 1.2 specifically states
that a "lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation." 010 In addition,
sounding an obligatory note, Model Rule 1.4(a)(2) states that a
"lawyer shall reasonably consult with the client about the means by
which the client's objectives are to be accomplished." 10 1 In light of
the fact that one of the board's responsibilities-both by statute and
in furtherance of its own fiduciary duty-is to oversee and monitor
officer conduct, counsel to the board should suggest, toward that
end, that he or she periodically explain fiduciary duties to the
officers. Furthermore, a free flow of information between the lawyer
and officers of the client is essential for allowing the lawyer to
"render candid advice," 102 and to fulfill the duty to "advise the client
to refrain from wrongful conduct."113 Finally, as agents acting on
97. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
98.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.2. (2003); see also In re

Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 963 (Del. Ch. 1996).
99.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2003).

100. Id. R. 1.2.
101. Id. R. 1.4(a)(2).
102. Id. R. 2.1.
103. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 2. The Comment, in a predecessor version of Model Rule
1.6, put the matter more straightforwardly: "One of the lawyer's functions is to
advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law ....
Id. R. 1.6 cmt.
(1983); see also Gordon, supra note 78, at 1196 (noting this comment is one of
the few recognizing a lawyer's duty to advise compliance with laws). In the
extreme, a lawyer who wrongly fails to prevent officer wrongdoing could face
criminal liability, as seen recently in the convictions of former counsel for
Hollinger International, Inc. See Paul D. Paton, Suddenly, They're Holding
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behalf of the corporation in their own dealings with corporate
officers, T lawyers themselves owe an agent's customary fiduciary
duty of care and skill.' 5
These considerations reinforce the
advisability and desirability of corporate counsel routinely advising
senior officers as to the existence and scope of their fiduciary duties.
Under section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,10 6 and SEC Rule
205 thereunder, 01 7 legal counsel who appear and practice before the
SEC must appropriately "report up" not only securities law
violations but also breaches of "fiduciary duty" by corporate officers
and agents.'0 8 Accordingly, officer breaches of duty must be reported
Corporate Counsel to a Higher Standard, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), July 19,

2007, at A17. Professor Paton notes, and comments on, the convictions of Mark
Kipnis and Peter Atkinson, former lawyers who were found guilty, along with
Conrad Black, in connection with the Hollinger Scandal. Id.
104. Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 955, 970-74 (2005) (elaborating on general counsel's position as an
agent of the corporation); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-situating
the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1009 (2005) (noting

the mismatch between a lawyer's fiduciary duty as an agent of the corporation
and the need to report to managers who themselves are co-agents of the
company); see also Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Responsibility: Ensuring
Independent Judgment of the General Counsel-A Look at Stock Options, 81

N.D. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2005) (exploring the effects of granting stock options to
general counsel).
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §8.08 (2006). Recent revisions to §
8.42(b) of the Model Business Corporation Act provide as follows:
b) The duty of an officer includes the obligation: ...
(1) to inform the superior officer to whom, or the board of directors or
the committee thereof to which, the officer reports of information
about the affairs of the corporation known to the officer, within the
scope of the officer's functions, and known to the officer to be material
to such superior officer, board or committee; and
(2) to inform his or her superior officer, or another appropriate person
within the corporation, or the board of directors, or a committee
thereof, of any actual or probable material violation of law involving
the corporation or material breach of duty to the corporation by an
officer, employee, or agent of the corporation, that the officer believes
has occurred or is likely to occur.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 8.42(b) (2005). Section 8.42(b)(2) imposes on all
officers a duty to report an actual or probable material breach of fiduciary duty,
whether past or imminent. As an officer, general counsel would be within the
coverage of this provision and, consequently, must "report up." Moreover,
section 8.42(b)(1) requires an officer to appropriately report material
information that is within the scope of the officer's functions. For any legal
counsel within the company, that provision mandates "reporting up" any breach
of fiduciary duty or other violation of law because such matters would be
"within the scope of the officer's functions." Id.
106. See Standards of Professional Conduct, supra note 2.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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by corporate counsel. In light of this, it seems prudent and only fair
for legal counsel, ex ante, not only to inform officers that any
breaches of duty on their part must be reported, but also to go
further and actually advise officers that they have fiduciary duties
and tell them what they need to do to fulfill those duties. This
seems a prudent practice with respect to both reporting and
nonreporting companies. Such a preventive, gatekeeping approach
to the subject of fiduciary duties seems at least as important as, if
not more important than, imposing an ex post reporting duty on
lawyers. In fact, Model Rule 1.13(b) can be read to the same effect.
It states that
[if a] lawyer for an organization knows that an officer .

.

. is

engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter
related to the representation that is a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization

.

.

.

then the lawyer shall

proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization. 10 9
If a lawyer must act once an officer actually breaches a "legal
obligation to the corporation"" 0-- e.g., a fiduciary duty-prudence
and competence would suggest the wisdom of a lawyer advising
officers, ex ante, that they have fiduciary obligations and what they
entail."' Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002,
corporate lawyers have been working with both directors and
officers to implement its directives, many of which are designed to
head off corporate wrongdoing before it happens." Consequently,
consistent with that preventive approach to complying with
statutory mandates, lawyers should routinely advise officers as to

109. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b). For an argument that
Model Rule 1.13 is designed to protect the organization as client, while SEC
Rule 205 is aimed at protecting investors, see William Matthews, Robert
Hoffman, & Daniel Scott, Conflicting Loyalties Facing In-House Counsel:
Ethical Care and Feeding of the Ravenous Multi-Headed Client, 37 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 901, 922 (2006). SEC Rule 205.3, however, states that the corporation is
the client. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and
Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.3 (2003). Model Rule 1.6 also permits a lawyer to "report out" in certain
situations. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3) (2003).
110.
111.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003).
See also, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 ("Loyalty and

independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to the
client.").
112. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-OxleyAct and
Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1202 (2004) (exploring
Sarbanes-Oxley's implications and how lawyers will communicate this
information to clients).
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statutory and judge-made mandates in the fiduciary duty area when
representing both public and private companies. That many recent
governance reforms are structural in nature is no reason to neglect
the more traditional and all-encompassing role of fiduciary duties as
a preventive mechanism.
We acknowledge that the Model Rules, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
and other rules governing the professional responsibility of lawyers
in the area of corporate representation largely depend on
governance relationships and legal duties designed by corporate law.
The legal responsibilities of corporate officers are, we also
acknowledge, not currently well defined in legal doctrine.
Consequently, continuing failure within corporate law to clarify the
fiduciary position of officers-who are, after all, "duly authorized
constituents" in the words of Model

Rule

1.13113 -within

the

governance web means lawyers may not be giving the quality of
advice they should because they simply do not know what to say.
This, ultimately, is a professional failure, but it is perhaps an
understandable one that stems from misunderstandings or
incompleteness within corporate law itself, as was described in Part
I.
Another reason for lawyers to fully advise corporate officers
about their fiduciary status is to alter officer self-concept and sense
of role within the company. We believe that persons who, in strong
language, are told by a respected figure, such as legal counsel, that
they owe a special responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of others are more likely to refrain from negative conduct
and engage in positive conduct than are people who believe they can
solely advance their own interest."' To advise someone that they
have been "entrusted" with responsibility for others' money and that
they must be "loyal" to those persons' interests and those of the
larger enterprise in carefully discharging "stewardship" duties is
likely, we believe, to lead the listener both to consciously desire to
act at a higher level and, possibly, actually to perform at a higher
level. By agreeing to serve in that fiduciary position, the person is
saying-both to the employer and herself-that she understands her
position in just those terms and assents to those terms. As
described by Stephen Young:
Fiduciary obligations flow from a principle within the moral
sense that sensitizes us to the use of power when others come
into view. Fiduciary thinking gives us a morality for decision
making, an ethics of character, and wisdom. Fiduciary
thinking makes us trustworthy, enhancing thereby the moral
113.

See MODEL RULES

OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 1.13(a).

114. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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quality of that society in which we live and work.""
The absence of such moral-sounding language, by way of
contrast, may lead an actor (such as an officer) to believe that he or
she largely may (and perhaps should) act out of self-interested
motives. The inaction of lawyers on this matter may itself be
sending a negative signal to officers and thereby reinforcing an
unhealthy norm.
Moreover, by advising officers of their fiduciary duties, the
lawyer is not telling the officer what to do. Rather, given that
116
fiduciary duties are phrased as broad, open-ended concepts,
providing fiduciary duty advice offers an approach to shaping
corporate behavior that was nicely described by Professor Simon as
specifying "substantive norms that are deliberately under-specified
coupled with duties on the part of the regulated party to themselves
identify and clarify the ambiguities in the norms.""7 When lawyers
clearly and regularly impart to officers that they owe duties of care
and loyalty, these social-legal norms will help officers reflectively
assess, and possibly alter, their own conduct.
This is not a
substitute for the lawyer, in appropriate settings, bringing to bear
his or her own judgment as to the propriety of a transaction or
course of conduct. Rather, it supplements the view of the lawyer
and avoids unhealthy client efforts to wholly shift responsibility to
the lawyer to legally "pass" on or "bless" the matter. Officers are
made aware that with respect to any and all aspects of their conduct
they must always satisfy themselves that they have fully discharged
their fiduciary duties to the company."'
This is not "moral
counseling" as such, but it is legal counseling to the effect that
officers themselves have duties with moral content." 9
When self-interest and organizational well-being are aligned,
the actor advances both. Many devices, especially in the executive
compensation area, therefore seek to align officer and company
welfare. The problem with this approach is that it assumes the
usual arm's length, commercial setting wherein the norm and
115.

STEPHEN YOUNG, MORAL CAPITALISM:

RECONCILING PRIVATE INTEREST

(2003).
116. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 112, at 1194.
117. William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional

WITH THE PUBLIC GOOD 59

Responsibilitiesof the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1462 (2006).

118. Thus, even if the law has significantly proceduralized the duty of
loyalty, we think, unlike Professor Donald C. Langevoort, that corporate law
still has "moral force" in being imparted to officers in a way that shapes their
conduct ex ante. See Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and
Economics: Legitimacy and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75

1615, 1624 (2006).
119. Rhode, supranote 8, at 1329.

FORDHAM

L. REV.

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

practice is to advance self-interest. In a relationship known by the
actor-because he or she was clearly told-to be a fiduciary
relationship, we believe many persons will behave differently than
they would in a nontrust relationship. This position, of course, could
probably be tested empirically in a properly designed experiment.1o
We believe for now that altering self-awareness of corporate officers
by strongly advising them of their fiduciary status can pervasively
alter how they perceive their roles, and in a way that may upgrade
corporate conduct. And, conversely, we believe efforts aimed solely
to align officer and corporate interests, thought inevitably to be at
odds with each other, may actually build on and strengthen an
underlying assumption of unalloyed self-interest that should be
countered, not reinforced.
We believe our views are, in principle if not current practice,
consistent with the views of many in the corporate bar. For
example, in 2003 the American Bar Association Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility highlighted the pivotal role played by
lawyers in assuring that corporations comply with law: "The Task
Force believes that a prudent corporate governance program should
call upon lawyers-notably the corporation's general counsel-to
assist in the design and maintenance of the corporation's procedures
for promoting legal compliance." 2' The Report for the ABA House of
Delegates specifically highlighted the role lawyers play in advising,
among others, corporate officers: "Legal counsel who provide advice
to public corporations, through their directors, officers and
employees, on compliance with the corporation's legal obligations"
are an important component of good corporate governance. 122 We
120. See Lynn A. Stout, Taking Conscience Seriously 7 (2007) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Gruter Inst. Project on Values & Free Enterprise)
("Laboratory experiments confirm that altruistic behavior.., is in fact
extremely common. This is most clearly demonstrated by the results of such
well-known experimental treatments as the Ultimatum Game, the Dictator
Game, the Trust Game, and the Social Dilemma, experiments designed to test
what real people do when placed in positions where their self-interest conflicts
with the interests of others."). We suspect that people who are explicitly told
they have a "trust" or "fiduciary" responsibility for the well-being of others
would show an even more marked tendency to quell self-interest.
121. Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, 59 Bus. LAw. 145, 166 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/

buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final-report.pdf [hereinafter Task Force Report].
122. Am. BAR. Assoc., TASK FORCE REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE ABA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNANCE POLICY RESOLUTIONS

7 (2003),

http://www.abanet.org/legaled/accreditation/foreignprogramtf/finalreport.doc;
see also N.Y. CITY BAR, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 29-30 (2006), available at http://www.abcny.org/

pdf/report/CORPORATEGOVERNANCE06.pdf.
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believe that lawyers should advise officers not only to ensure that
corporations comply with applicable laws but also to bolster the
likelihood that the officers themselves comply with their obligations
to the company. We think this sensibly follows from one of the Task
Force's recommendations:
Public corporations should adopt practices in which ... (c) [a]ll

reporting relationships of internal and outside counsel for a
public corporation establish at the outset a direct line of
communication with general counsel through which these
lawyers are to inform the general counsel of material potential
or ongoing violations
123 of law by, and breaches of fiduciary duty
to, the corporation.

If lawyers are to report "potential" or "ongoing" breaches of fiduciary
duty, a sensible preventive law approach to governance reform
demands that lawyers first advise officers as to the existence and
scope of those fiduciary duties.
It appears also that in-house legal counsel, in principle, would
support our views. A large-scale 2002 survey of in-house counsel
revealed that fifty-seven percent of in-house lawyers said they
should play as important a role as the CEO, COO, or CFO in
preventing fraud, and an additional twelve percent said that inhouse counsel should take the leading role within the company.124
Interestingly, although the survey asked in-house lawyers which of
several options would best assist them in preventing fraud, the
menu of possibilities included the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, Sarbanes-Oxley, and new SEC disclosure requirements,
but did not include advising officers as to, and urging officers to
comply with, state-law-imposed fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties of
officers should be, but apparently are not, on the minds of those who
constructed the survey.
One possible technique for efficiently conveying information
about fiduciary duties to senior officers, besides regular, in-person
advising sessions scheduled by counsel, is through a corporation's
code of conduct. Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires
companies to disclose whether they have such a code,'12' and virtually

all public companies do have such codes. Designing such codes is an
appropriate function for general counsel. These codes of conduct can
be provided to every employee,'26 and, in addition, a separate code
123. Task Force Report, supra note 121, at 177 (emphasis added).
124. Press Release, Am. Corp. Counsel Assoc., Summary of Findings,
In-House Counsel Poll on Corporate Scandals (Oct. 21, 2002),
http://www.acca.com/about/press/item.php?key=20021021_15263.
125. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 112, at 1185.
126. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc., Code of Conduct, http://www.medtroniccom/
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can be specifically designed for and distributed to senior officers, as
is done, for example, at Medtronic, Inc. 127 The code for senior officers
should include, we believe, a section succinctly describing fiduciary
duties owed by officers to the company. Legal counsel should also
regularly review and explain those responsibilities with senior
officers, thereby avoiding the excuse of counsel simply not having
occasion to give such advice; such occasion should be affirmatively
created by legal counsel. Each year, moreover, senior officers could
be required to affirm in writing that they understand and agree to
comply with the code of conduct (which includes a description of
fiduciary duties). In fact, as at Medtronic, 128 all key managers could
be required not only to personally so affirm, but also to affirm that
they have given the code to all of their direct reports and that they
are not aware of any unreported violations of the code. These
certifications ultimately would be routed to the Audit Committee
and reported on by that committee to the full board of directors as
part of its regular internal control and risk management report.
Separately, general counsel-whose hiring and compensation
should be approved by the board"129-could be required by the board
to annually certify to it that general counsel (i) has provided senior
officers with a code of conduct specifically describing, among other
matters, fiduciary duties; (ii) has reviewed those duties (and other
responsibilities) with senior officers within the last twelve months;
and (iii) is not aware of any evidence that would be a reportable
securities law violation or fiduciary duty breach under SEC Rule
205 or under any other provision of the code.' 30 Knowledge that
general counsel will regularly report directly to the board on these
matters, not simply meet with the board or its independent
directors," 1 will bolster counsel's position in relation to the CEO,
corporate-governance/downloads/code82005.pdf.
127. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc., Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers,
http://www.medtronic.com/corporate-governance/codeethics.html.
128. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance and views of Tom
Holloran, former President and General Counsel of Medtronic, Inc., for bringing
this information to our attention. Mr. Holloran did not participate in our
survey.
129. See Task Force Report, supra note 121, at 177 ("[Slelection, retention,
and compensation of the corporation's general counsel ... [should be] approved
by the board of directors.").
130. See supra note 2. This certification also could be done by counsel with
respect to nonreporting companies by slight modification to the wording of our
proposal to capture the essential thrust of what Rule 205 addresses.
131. We support the view of the ABA Task Force that general counsel should
meet regularly with the board of directors and its independent directors, but we
would go beyond the Task Force recommendations to require that in those
meetings, general counsel should simply "communicate concerns" and require

2007]

(NOT)ADVISING CORPORATE OFFICERS

13 2
given that counsel, as an officer, generally reports to the CEO.
Moreover, by certifying the matters described above, general counsel
is serving a useful "internal" gatekeeping function on behalf of the
board itself, in relation to officer conduct which the board is legally
required to monitor. 3 3 Communicating this enhanced governance
check to investors can bolster their confidence in both directors and
officers. The reputational gains, moreover, may extend beyond the
investment community into customer and employee relationships as
well.

V.

CONCLUSION

The law of officer fiduciary duties remains surprisingly
unsettled. Officers ultimately may be held to stricter, or the same,
standards of conduct and judicial review as those governing
directors. In either event, officers, unlike directors, typically are not
exculpated from damages for duty of care breaches. Moreover, to be
indemnified by the corporation, officers must act in good faith.
Thus, it is in their own self-interest for officers to know about and
comply with their fiduciary duties. 131
Officer conduct also greatly affects the company itself and its
investors, probably more so than the activities of directors.
Consequently, it is in the company's best interests that officers
faithfully fulfill their legal duties. There are several reasons why
the affirmative certification outlined in the text. Task Force Report, supra note
121, at 32.
132. See Fisch & Rosen, supra note 3, at 1136 (noting that "[sitructures in
which lawyers regularly report directly to the board ... allow lawyers to bypass
managers without creating the risk of retaliation that might result from
sporadic reporting up").
133. This "internal" certification differs, of course, from the two different
kinds of "external" certifications advocated by Professor Coffee and Professor
Laby. See COFFEE, supra note 76; Laby, supra note 76; see also supra note 76
and accompanying text.
134. Corporate officers, of course, are not the clients of legal counsel to the
company. See supra note 75. Counsel, when advising officers, are offering
advice to them in their capacity as representatives of the company. Thus,
lawyers must make it very clear to officers that no lawyer-client relationship
exists between them. This may be challenging in those instances where officers
seek guidance from counsel as to whether certain conduct or proposed action is,
in counsel's view, consistent with the officer's fiduciary duties. Advice in that
context is appropriate but it must be made clear-notwithstanding evident
awkwardness-that the officer is being advised as a representative of the
company, not personally. We also note that officers, unlike directors, may not
have a statutory right to rely on legal counsel or other persons. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001). But see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30, 8.42 (2005).
The authors thank Justice Randy Holland and Professor David Hoffman for
highlighting these points.
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legal counsel for the corporation should fully and regularly explain
fiduciary duties to officers. By doing so, lawyers can help instill
healthier norms of corporate conduct under the auspices of openended legal duties to which officers and managers must conform
their behavior. Under an optimistic scenario, we may then continue
to see a dearth of case law addressing officer duties, not, however,
due to legal uncertainty as to their scope, but because officers, with
lawyerly help, are doing better at what the law requires.
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APPENDIX A

FIDUCIARY DUTY ADVICE QUESTIONNAIRE
Your identity and responses to this questionnaire will
remain confidential. Questionnaire responses from many
lawyers and law firms will be collected and the aggregate
responses will be used in a published research paper, but
without identification of the respondents.
I.

Background Information

1.

In which city and state do you primarily practice?

2. Do you practice in a law firm or are you in-house counsel at a
corporation?
3. If you practice in a law firm, how many attorneys practice in
your firm?

II. Advising Corporate Directors
NOTE: If your responses require more space than we have provided,
please use whatever additional paper you need to fully answer the
questions and include those pages with this questionnaire.
4. Please generally describe how you advise a corporation's Board
of Directors, or individual directors, as to their fiduciary duties?

a. Do you advise directors in transactional settings, nontransactional settings, both, or neither? Please list examples of
situations where you would advise directors on their fiduciary
duties.
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b. Do you or your firm have a standard or "model" set of
instructions for advising directors on fiduciary duties? If so,
would you kindly enclose a copy?

c. What do you say to directors of Delaware corporations about
the fiduciary duty of care? If you do not represent Delaware
corporations, what do you say to directors about the fiduciary
duty of care under the law of the state where the majority of
your corporate clients are organized, and which state is that?

d. What do you say to directors of Delaware corporations about
the fiduciary duty of loyalty? If you do not represent Delaware
corporations, what do you say to directors about the fiduciary
duty of loyalty under the law of the state where the majority of
your corporate clients are organized?

e. What do you say to directors of Delaware corporations about
the fiduciary duty of good faith? If you do not represent
Delaware corporations, what do you say to directors about the
fiduciary duty of good faith under the law of the state where the
majority of your corporate clients are organized?

III. Advising Corporate Officers
5. Please generally describe how you advise senior corporate
officers (Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer
(CFO), for example) as to their fiduciary duties, specifically in their
capacity as senior corporate officers?
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a. Do you advise officers in transactional settings, nontransactional settings, both, or neither? Please list examples of
situations where you advise officers on fiduciary duties.
Specifically, which officers (CEO, CFO, for example) do you
advise as to fiduciary duties?

b. Do you or your firm have a standard or "model" set of
instructions for advising officers on fiduciary duties? If so,
would you kindly enclose a copy?

c.

What do you say to officers about the fiduciary duty of care?

d. What do you say to officers about the fiduciary duty of
loyalty?

e. What else, if anything, do you say to officers about their
fiduciary duties?

IV. Additional and Follow-up Information
6. Is there anything else you would like to describe in connection
with offering fiduciary duty advice to directors and officers?
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7. Are you willing to discuss further, with Professor Lyman
Johnson, by telephone or in-person, the subject of advising directors
and officers as to their fiduciary duties? If so, please provide your
name and telephone number below. Your responses, however, will
remain confidential.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RESPONSES.

